The Next Generation of Social Movements:
From May '68 in Paris to the June Days of Rio de Janeiro

Why traditional labor movements have been sidelined in the contemporary struggle against inequality, and lessons youth and unions can learn from each other

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This paper is part of a larger GLU alumni project in the early phases. The project coordinators have worked together on this initial phase of the research, however, as the paper indicates, they are interested in expanding the research to encompass a number of other countries. Recent global events provide a host of incredibly rich experiences that could be compared and discussed within this framework. The research is in its initial phases and it is hoped that by sharing now, it will lead to opportunities to continue to expand the project.

At this stage there are plans to look at the Occupy Wall Street Movement, the student strikes in Montreal, Quebec, Taksim Square in Turkey, and possibly *Los Indignados* in Spain. There are many possibilities.

"The old believe everything; the middle-aged suspect everything; the young know everything." - Oscar Wilde

In recent years, the world has witnessed new waves of mass social movements unlike those of prior generations. From the Arab Spring, to *Los Indignados* in Madrid, youth across the world seem to have "woken up" from a generational slumber. Fueled by social media and freed from the political confines of the cold-war debate, young people are taking to the streets in unprecedented numbers demanding that we reimagine the future world the youth will inherit. Noticeably sidelined in this new movement, are traditional actors like trade unions and political parties.

A driving force behind many of these mass protests has been growing inequality – often (but not always) a consequence of decades of neoliberal economic policy unraveling. But what makes these movements unique, is a deep mistrust – not just of politicians – but of politics itself. This sentiment manifests itself with today's youth expressing disinterest or outright rejection of traditional social and political actors like trade unions and political parties – *even when such actors would be logical allies with shared goals*. The cry from Argentina in 2001, "Que Se Vayan Todos!" ("All of them must go!"), has been echoed on the streets from Iceland to Greece (Klein, 2009). But it is important not to confuse a rejection of traditional forms of organization with a rejection of political engagement. However, a number of questions concerning sustainability and longevity have arisen, striking at the heart of what it means to build political power. Are these movements truly capable of building the kind of institutional political power capable of changing policies? How will these forces contend with traditional organizations like unions? And how can they avoid co-optation by other social and political forces?

This article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the history of youth movements from a sociological perspective of social movements, in order to place today's struggle in an evolutionary perspective. Part II explores the decline in youth participation in traditional movements (such as political parties and trade unions) and the new forms of youth engagement. The final section will examine the June Days in Brazil. By placing these events in the historical context of youth social movements, and the newest global wave of protests, the events of June in Brazil serve to illustrate one example of this emerging phenomenon.

It is important to clarify that many of the international currents and trends are unmistakably ongoing. Consequently, all findings and hypotheses raised in this article are still evolving. We hope to have the opportunity to continue to develop these theories as events around the world will undoubtedly continue to unfold.

I.   Different historical moments, one factor in common: youth engagement.

The issue of youth and their political and social involvement is an important and recently expanding field in the sociology of social movements. This field of knowledge is composed of several different approaches and focuses on questions related to collective action, organization, associations, disputes and groups of interests composed of various subjects. Most recently, the subfield of sociology focusing on social movements has encountered a new challenge: an era of new social subjects with new demands and new forms of engagement. Contemporary actions have given voice to new sociopolitical actors, historically excluded from discussion and spaces of participation - a prime example being youth.

Maria da Gloria Gohn, a Brazilian sociologist, has written at length on the topic of social movements and youth involvement. She has developed a framework whereby such movements are grouped into three distinct categories that we will borrow for this article: a) The well-known youth of 1968 (challenging broad social and political orthodoxy); b) The anti-globalization movements in the late 1990s (during the peak of the implementation of neoliberalism); and c) Current movements organized around the uniting principle of general "outrage" at the current state of affairs.

The premise of our work is that there is indeed a new model of *associativism* in the contemporary world. Numerous distinctions could be drawn between the current movements and the prior phases (either the revolts in the 1960s or collective actions against globalization). Perhaps most remarkable, however, are the differences in the fields of identity composition and the communication strategies used.

The Sprit of '68
Many authors have described the 1960s (perhaps best exemplified by the events of Paris 1968) as a great cultural and behavioral revolution led by young people in various countries. That generation longed for a new kind of freedom that was beyond the

paradigms imposed by prior generations of parents and grandparents. They created utopias and sought to engage in politics in many new and different forms that are still in effect today. For example, alliances were formed between peasants and students, to discuss the vision of a new society. This kind of alliance led some leaders and activists to directly discuss the prospect of organizing for and defending revolutions on a national and international scale, (Gohn. 2013). Perhaps Che Guevara, and his *"Socialismo y El Hombre Nuevo en Cuba"* (Socialism & The New Man in Cuba) embody many of the theoretical constructs of this generation.

The youth from the 1960s have also influenced modern discussions about gender, ethnicity, age and the specificities of sexual freedom. The movement strengthened new identities of what it meant to "be a student" or "be a woman" even redefining what it meant to "be a person of color". Instead of posting on their facebook wall, they scrawled their messages on walls of the cities and universities they inhabited in the form of graffiti or wheat pasted posters.

The great example of this historical moment is May 1968 in France. What began as a student struggle for improvements in the university and accommodation, expanded into a movement beyond students, involving intellectuals, poets, musicians, workers (especially in the auto industry) and peasants. The political agenda that was initially only relevant within the walls of universities, quickly became relevant to all of France – becoming a movement for freedom, against authoritarianism and against the conservative government of General Charles De Gaulle.

But France was not the only part of the world rocked by youth led social movements in 1968. Northern Italy and other parts of Europe echoed the struggle in France with their own waves of strikes. The student movement in Berlin saw the attempted assassination of a national SDS leader (Rudi Dutshke) and waves of massive protests leading to hundreds of injuries and two deaths. Meanwhile students in Madrid stood up against Franco demanding democratic control of trade unions and education. The U.S. saw the burning of draft cards and bras, as well as a massive civil rights struggle, especially in the southern states. And in Latin America, students were literally gunned down in Mexico City during the Olympics while other countries marched against dictatorships and US imperialism (In Brazil more than 100,000 marched against the dictatorship).

At that moment, despite the absence of internet, international solidarity between youth spread as the first wave of social movements was linked through the images of television (Gohn, 2013). Bound together by the evening news, young people around the world witnessed other movements and international solidarity was easily fostered out of common cause. Moreover, it was a moment marked by artistic creativity in political struggle in various ways, including music, poetry, or on the walls of the cities. Some authors, such as Rancière, argue that this was also a consequence of a new generation embracing Marxist readings, such as those of Gramsci, who offered a framework for contextualizing the struggle within the dysfunctional and alienating culture that many youth experienced as an important factor in overcoming capitalism.

Almost universally, student and youth movements were met with extreme brutality by state power. States did not hesitate to exercise their monopoly on the use of force to deal with the new social movements. All movements were severely oppressed, having leaders killed, imprisoned and expelled from countries. This modus operandi is still seen in demonstrations today.

Despite the criticism that this generation of protests has garnered with regard to identity politics (struggle based on factors other than class – ie gender, race, students, sexual orientation), many authors also argue that this movement was an eruption of feelings and repressed wills, impossible to stifle. Regardless of their consequences, the youth fervor that erupted in that generation has become an icon in the struggle of youth for change. Yet many of the lessons of this generation were lost in the ensuing years.

The Anti-Globalization Generation

The children of those in the streets in 1968 came of age during the 1990s. The anti-globalization movements were significant on an international scale especially after the events of Seattle, in the United States, in 1999. During this era, massive demonstrations had specific dates and places: Youth followed the meetings of international organizations, such the WTO or the G8, from Seattle to Genoa, and back to Cancun. The form of mobilization is also distinct. And while street protests were common to each of these events, the main activities were often meetings, large gatherings, and marches. A prime example of the organizational effort of these movements was the creation of the World Social Forum.

With regard to the political agenda, the discussions ceased to have as its central focus the culture and values of the time as the 1960s had, and it only tangentially embraced any class analysis. Instead, the discussion was framed along the lines of macroeconomic policies and their effects on the global marketplace – with regard to economics, politics, social values, and the environment.

The wave of anti-globalization protests was also a response to the implementation of neoliberal policies implemented in the years after the end of the cold war, as market based solutions and development cemented its hegemonic place in important institutions of global governance. As the *Chicago Boys* accepted jobs at the World Bank and the IMF, Reagan and Thatcher remade the remnants of Bretton-Woods in their image. The neoliberal consensus was defined by dismantling workers' rights and social protections, while simultaneously opening and reengineering markets (often meaning deindustrialization). To Boito, this model is organized from: "a) deregulation of the labor market, b) privatization and c) commercial financial openness" (Boito, 2012).

In this regard, the agenda of the antiglobalization movement was mostly concerned with the perverse effects of economic globalization, (Gohn, 2013), though these effects also impacted the political field. Additionally, environmental politics radicalized many new young activists. The subjects of these events are organized by different identities, which is what makes this movement's dialogue with the movements of the previous decades complex. According to Zizek (2012), the "class struggle essentialism" of prior decades was replaced by pluralism of antiracism struggles, for sexual rights, feminism, etc. Despite the participation of trade unions in the World Social Forum, they were not major actors of these new forms of struggle.

The disillusion of this wave of protest began in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001. Protest movements that had been very strong in the United States lost strength and similar actions throughout the world began to decrease in popularity. Even the World Social Forum, felt the impact of this disengagement.

Building on the movements of the 1960s, the "antiglobalists" not only followed the trend of thinking creatively about new forms of engagement and political action, but they began a marked shift in their relationship with traditional forms of organization such as political parties and unions.

The Recently "Outraged"

More recently, especially in the years following the financial crisis of 2008, social movements and mass mobilizations of youth became fashionable once again. The unifying theme of today's movements has been one of *outrage*. Fiscal concerns are still present, especially in an age of austerity in many countries. However, today's youth utilize a more nuanced approach, critiquing the consequences on the lives of people (especially young people) of modern economic policy fueled on financialization and unrestricted capital flows. Unemployment and the poor quality of public services, such as education and health, are concrete issues affecting millions of youth today (Gohn, 2013).

The modern configuration of labor markets is an important factor for outrage. Social, political and economic inequity, the precariousness of work relations, the rise of the informal sector in most countries and outsourcing, have all contributed in normalizing "precariousness". Without stability, security, or a job to look forward to, youth face a precarious future in many countries, as the safety net of prior generations is yanked from below their feet.

An important study examining increasing participation of youth in "non-conventional" organizations was conducted by the researcher Pippa Norris at Harvard University. The author concluded that political activism of youth has increased - rather than decreased, as is sometimes suggested - but there has been a change in the methods of political participation. Today's youth prefer less formal movements and organizations, such as those that the author classifies as cause-oriented movements, where the distance between the social and the political would be dissolved.

Current protests are distinct from those of the 1990s, but are a product of the neoliberal decade, which increased social exclusion from the political process and the economy. Yet just as neoliberal ideology reshaped gutted social protections and union power, it also redefined how youth conceptualized resistance. In the globalized world, new kinds of associative dynamics stand out, as well as new strategies for collective action in accordance with the local and regional environment. Therefore, as much as the movements have many similarities, to study them, it is necessary to consider local histories and conjunctures.

The forms of communication and mobilization are key elements of modern social movements. These forms among young people, have changed with technological advances. The Internet and social media have become the main instrument of mobilization and coordination of these movements. Communication occurs not only through computers and the Internet. Advances in cell phones and different forms of mobile media have brought new ways of mobilizing, and organizing direct action. Manuel Castells (2011) calls this type of technology "self-communication of the masses," which inherently calls into question the role of political parties or large charismatic leaders.

Another general feature of new social movements is how they refer to themselves. Because they are heterogeneous and in most cases without unifying ideologies, movements adopt the names of dates that marked the apex of the movement or the beginning of them, such as the March 12 Movement (M12M) or the Rasca Generation in Portugal, or even the March 15 Movement (M15M) of Spain (also known as "Los Indignados"), or the "June Days" as the massive street demonstrations that occurred in June of 2013 in Brazil. Moreover, it is also possible to find movements that refer to themselves by the places where they transpire, such as Occupy Wall Street.

Thus through the magic of modern technology and a general state of discontent regarding failed economic, social, and political policy, youth are undeniably taking to the streets. But they are united by dates and places and unlike prior generations, they are not guided by great unifying ideologies or utopias. According to Alves, these movements express in their diversity and breadth of political expectations, a variety of critiques stemming from a social consciousness able to say "no" and move against the *status quo*. They have, as a dynamic social movement, a deep moral ballast of the critical impulse to be indignant. To paraphrase Marx, they do, but they do not know (Alves, 2012).

II.   Crisis of representation: decline of youth participation in traditional organizations

Beginning in the 1980's, the globalization process and the restructuring of production supply chains accelerated the undercutting of the power of unions to protect their segments of labor markets. Unemployment rates have increased in countries that once

enjoyed strong manufacturing basis, as global capital has sought out cheaper and more flexible sources for labor. In Europe, the welfare state has endured a barrage of attacks – predating the most recent austerity measures. These shifts in production and labor markets have been inherently weakening for labor movements.

Intellectuals across the world have even started to debate the necessity of workers' organizations, as trade unions and leftist parties seek to revitalize themselves. If the labor market has changed and the labor relations regimes have also changed, then labor organizations need to reexamine why traditional methods are no longer effective at securing a fair share of the wealth labor creates.

The majority of today's generation of youth that join the labor market do not join trade unions. Worldwide, youth represent a significant part of the labor market, but still a low rate in the trade unions. In Europe, for example, more than 90% of workers that are less than 30 years old are in the labor market, but only around 10% of them are members of a union. In the majority of Latin America, more than 90% of the workers that are less than 25 years old are in the labor market. This represents 25% of the entire labor force, but they have a very low rate of participation in trade unions. In the largest trade union central in Brazil, CUT, youth represented only 2.8% in the Union Congress. Even when the youth is affiliated, only a minority are often engaged (Soares, 2007).

> According to Bryson et al., the universal process of union decline, manly with regard to young workers, has several general causes, some exogenous - like globalization, changes in the labor market and the transformations that were already presented - and endogenous causes such as those "linked to union (in)action (lack of connection with youth, new generations and new social movements; reliance on traditional organizing methods adapted to manufacturing industry, large firms or the public sector; inadequate services and increased competition from alternative providers, including the welfare state and social insurance)" (Bryson et al., 2011)

Another reason for this decline present in the literature is "the iron law of oligarchy" (1989), as posited by Richard Michels. He describes the disconnection between the leader group inside the unions and the shop floor agenda. This disconnection creates a massive process of bureaucratization of the labor movement.

Moreover, authors like Muller-Jentsch (1988) and Hyman (2001) have highlighted reasons for the crisis, as an increase in heterogeneity, difficulties in finding common interests, decentralization of regulatory regimes that leads to a "crisis of loyalty", and the inability of unions to reach out to the new working class and new segments of the economy that has lead to a "crisis of representation".

For many of the same factors, political parties have lost a considerable share of influence among the youth. Many political parties are having a difficult time redefining their relevance to modern economics – they suffer from a lack of a political agenda that attract young people. Thus while parties and unions may effectively be able to point out and identify problems created with austerity programs or cut-backs to public funding, few seem to mounting a campaign for alternatives. An important dimension in the discussion of youth participation in parties is the question of the image that these organizations built on public opinion. There are examples from many the parties who did not matched their rhetoric, corruption scandals and other factors that have severely damaged the image of traditional politics.

Furthermore, even if there is awareness of the importance of political parties and democratic institutions, most party structures do not welcome youth. Mayorga et al. conclude that while young people understand that traditional (or institutional) politics has the capacity to change their lives and some aspects of society (through public policy, for example), they cannot impact those organizations and structures with their demands, (Mayorga et al., 2012). Circumscribed in the same debate, Ruskowski (2009) argues that organizational structures play a significant role in youth engagement. The structure of new youth movements often works as a bridge that facilitates participation. In this regard, it is important to recognize the new structures in the new social movements. They are horizontal, with several opportunities opened to participation and with a participatory decision making process.

Most traditional organizations, by contrast, maintain clear hierarchal structures, forums for their leadership, and elections are not always democratic or transparent. These factors discourage participation for many young people. The rigid structures of traditional forms of organization have failed to welcome youth – who clearly demonstrate outrage at the current state of politics, however they do not view such organizations as vehicles to effectuate the change they hope to realize in their lifetimes.

Another dimension of the analysis, according to Ruskowski (2009), is the process of putting down roots. The author suggests that it is important to develop opportunities for members to create roots in the movement or organization. The author summed up some strategies to achieve this: the creation of spaces for socialization, their own symbolic identity (symbols, logos, t-shirts, flags) and new traditions (forms of intervention and some "mysticism"). These strategies, however, are more commonly used in new social movements than traditional.

Quantitative studies also confirm this analysis. In a study conducted in 2009, only 45% of the Portuguese population identified themselves with a political party, but among young people this number is only about 35% (Lisi 2012). Additionally, young people constitute the age group most underrepresented in the internal organization of political parties. In Brazil, for example, a study conducted in the early 2000s shows that only 35% of young people trust political parties - and only 3% fully trust them (Krischke, 2005).

Henn et al. (2002) argues that this mistrust is mutual. When conducting qualitative studies with focus groups in England, the authors noted that political parties, even if involuntarily, encourage politic passivity among young people. For example, party leaderships would not create opportunities for youth engagement or expression of demands or political discontents. These arguments try to blame youth itself (internal and external to the parties) for their underrepresentation.

In a study conducted in 15 European countries in 2004, Pipa Norris stated that only half of young people voted in the elections prior to the study, while 75% of the general population voted. Only 3% of young people belonged to a political party and only 40% have some political party as a political reference, when the overall rate is 65%. Norris (2004) also shows that this is not simply a "life cycle" of young people, insofar as these individuals could overcome this tendency as adults. Compared with other studies, the author argues that this is a generational change in their relationship with politics and tends to grow and continue beyond the stage of youth.

However, it is important to note that there are many initiatives to reverse this trend - the so-called crisis of "representation of traditional organizations." Many revitalization strategies are ongoing and this theme is already a field with a variety of academic research and debate within the analysis of political strategies and the sociology of social movements. However, we can conclude that despite efforts to reverse these trends,

traditional organizations have generally lost a considerable portion of legitimacy among youth.

In this sense, as defended by Hann et al. (2002), there has been an increase in the academic recognition that young people are generally less interested in "formal policy" than other (older) age groups and that this trend is not inevitable or a sign of political disinterest. In fact, some authors have concluded that young people are connected to the subjects of the realm of politics, but in a more natural way, outside the representative barriers of traditional organizations. The political energies of the younger generation have expanded through non-conventional participation rather than simply regressing to "apathy" or "apolitism" - as is often proclaimed in usual studies on the subject, (Norris, 2004).

Nevertheless, new social movements have their limitations. The lack of organizational structures in most of them, the absence of a unifying ideology and rich and interesting internal plurality of identities can also produce difficulties to achieve, in the long term, the challenges and objectives raised by them initially.

To verify this hypothesis and try to draw lessons from these initiatives, it is critical to take a closer look at an example of a *cause-oriented* movement - the June Days of Brazil. Through this example, many of themes discussed above will be illuminated.

III. June days: The youth mass protests in Brazil.

In June of 2013, in several cities of Brazil, numerous street demonstrations began. Some demonstrations coalesced up to one million people, mostly youth. In order to understand what happened in June of 2013, we need to understand the process of recent consolidation of democracy in Brazil and the current issues of Brazilian youth.

Brazil, like many countries in Latin America, recently emerged from a long and violent military dictatorship. In 1964, during a progressive government connected to the labor movement, a group of military officers - strengthened and legitimized by Brazilian businessmen and international imperialist forces (such as the US government) – took power in a military coup. For 21 years, under a violent regime, various movements and parties were dismantled, a generation of political leaders were murdered and disappeared, and repressive structures in various State bodies were assembled. Besides

these aspects, an extensive educational reform that dismembered courses and censored the academic production was performed.

The end of the military dictatorship and the democratic transition in Brazil was unique when compared to neighboring countries undergoing similar transitions. The political opening occurred slowly and carefully, ensuring a wide state structure of stays, seen today in the judiciary and in the organization of the police, for example. Even today, it the military police who handle civilian demonstrations in Brazil. Another example of the shortcomings of this transition is that it was not until 2012, 27 years after the transition, that a National Truth Commission was established to investigate serious violations of human rights from that period.

In the first direct national elections after the dictatorship (1989), despite the recent growth of the Workers Party (PT) which had succeeded in bringing together several popular segments of society, a candidate of the elite won: Fernando Collor de Mello. Elected to combat the economic crisis that generated high inflation, the president began to implement unorthodox economic policies, such as confiscating the savings of the general population. These measures coupled with the corruption scandals that revolved around the president, caused great popular mobilization, especially in the student movement.

In 1992, among a series of demonstrations calling for the Impeachment, Collor resigned. In the following years, despite the success of economic plans that returned the value to the domestic currency and beat back inflation, a package of neoliberal policies was implemented. As a result, many organizations have weakened, especially trade unions. During this period, the situation of the working class in Brazil worsened.

It was only after the election of President Lula, from the Workers Party (PT) in 2002, that the situation came to be more favorable for social movements. In their two governments (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), and the ongoing government (the successor of the party), many social policies were established, generating significant income redistribution (more than 30 million people have risen above poverty line) and new opportunities for countless Brazilians.

However, since the movements of the 1990s (the impeachment of Collor), youth has not taken to the streets in massive numbers. Following the international trend, the student

movement also lost strength between young people and their political agendas failing to mobilize in the early 2000s, the masses of young Brazilians.

But, in 2013, the country experienced a unique moment of outrage, initially centered on the issue of public transport in major cities: the movement against an increase of 20 cents in bus fare was what first brought youth from their homes. One of the legacies of the military dictatorship, deepened by the neoliberal governments of the 1990s, has been the precarization of public services. Coupled together with the growth of cities and the lack of concern for urban planning, has resulted in a diminished quality of life for many Brazilians.

In this regard, some authors like Ermínia Maricato have argued that the issue of urban crisis was the main reason of the June Days. Not every improvement of living conditions is accessible with better income distribution. According to the author, living conditions often depend on urban public policies, such as improving public transport, housing, education, etc. (Maricato 2013). Hence, the movement said "it was not about 20 cents", because it was actually about the outrage generated by urban chaos, and how failures in public transportation impact citizens' right to access the city.

The embryo of the "June Days" was in 2003 on the issue of transport. In the city of Salvador, in the northeastern state of Bahia, a series of demonstrations broke out against the increased tariff on public transportation and for better conditions of public transport in the city. At that moment, the movement was organized from two pillars: direct action and collective decisions made by assemblies. The Free Pass Movement (Movimento Passe Livre - MPL) estimates that approximately 40,000 young people participated in those early demonstrations. According to an article published by the movement itself, despite the massive mobilization of young people, student's organizations tried to speak on behalf of the movement and mediated with the government some measures. While these measures were viewed by many as insufficient, the mass demonstration did not continue (MPL 2013). In the following year, students in Florianópolis, on the other side of the country, occupied bus terminals and blocked access to the city in protest against raising tariffs.

However, it was only in June of 2013 that the demonstrations reached another level. The first demonstrations began small, both in Rio de Janeiro, and in São Paulo, appearing much like the protests of a decade earlier in smaller cities. However, brutal repression by the police was broadcast from cell phone videos to mainstream media

channels. The Free Pass Movement (MPL) only strengthened fueled by a wave of public outrage, and the protests only grew. There were demonstrations in all major cities, such as Manaus, Vitoria, Fortaleza, Natal, Salvador, Recife, Maceio, Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Goiânia, and Porto Alegre, bringing together millions of people around the country. Even in smaller towns, where the rate of public transport remained unchanged, there were acts of support for protests in large Brazilian cities.

In the beginning, the first demonstrations were organized by the autonomist movement called Free Pass Movement (Movimento Passe Livre – MPL) which had one of its main political agendas the issue of "zero tariff" for the end of the fare for public transport. The premise of the movement is that the turnstiles of public transport is a physical barrier that discriminates by applying criteria of income concentration, those who have access to the city, and those who do not. Accordingly, providing free public transport helps guarantee the right to access the city for all, regardless of income, class, or neighborhood (MPL 2013).

The marches of June grew dramatically, as millions of young people took to the streets. Many of them carried their own posters, bringing their public criticism, normally reserved for their facebook wall, to a placard they now carried in a demonstration: a poster for each person, each poster an idea. The question of access to the city and the urban chaos was the original center of the struggle, but other political agendas quickly emerged. Young people spoke out against the works for the World Cup, ironically calling for a FIFA level commitment to education. Others criticized the government and supported anti-corruption laws. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, for example, a wave of demonstrations erupted called "Out Cabral." The conservative state governor, Sergio Cabral, became a major target of the demonstrations due to his reputation for business friendly political cronyism.

Programmatic plurality, a question already discussed in examples from other countries, was also an element of the Days of June:

> Noticing their flags, posters and slogans, you can get an idea of this diversity of anonymous, unknown subject, at least in conventional politics (Calado, 2013, p. 03)

The issue of communication is also crucial here. It can be argued that social networks were the main instrument for the mobilization of the June Days. Even in São Paulo, to avoid clashes with the police, the Free Pass Movement (MPL) marked via the Internet

the meeting point, but only during the march would they defined the route via cell phone messages for mobilizers strategically placed throughout the march. Mainstream media played a more contradictory role. While demonizing protestors as violent or vandals, often glossing over the substantive issues driving the outrage, the press also helped spark a national response. The mere scale of the protests could not be ignored and national coverage of events in one city helped inspire movements to erupt throughout the country.

It is also important to note the participation of traditional organizations in the June days. The parties and the official student movements participated timidly in the early demonstrations. And in some cities, when parties and student organizations came with their flags, they were quickly rejected and even attacked by protestors. One of the greatest emotions that surfaced in these large street demonstrations was against all political direction. Castells describes this trend:

> They are against this precise democratic practice in which the political class appropriates the representation, do not report in no time and justify anything based on the interests that serve the state and the political class, in other words, economic, technological and cultural interests. They do not respect the citizens. This is the demonstration. That's what citizens think and feel: they are not respected. (Castells, 2013, p. 02)

The autonomist movements, at this point, were the best to lead the demonstrations. The struggles and the dates were marked in assembly, and any attempt of student organizations or political parties to drive those demonstrations was brutally removed, often by force.

On June 19, the mayors of the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo jointly declared the revocation of the increase in bus fares. Other mayors throughout Brazil followed their lead within a week. Many intellectuals and activists have argued that, by this victory, the tactic of not negotiating (in traditional committees and delegations) was correct.

Thus, it is possible to note that, as in other movements, "June Days" did not remain. Because this wave was composed of a disorganized majority, without militancy in any kind of organization, all events held after June/July 2013 were very small, even the demonstrations against the World Cup or against raising tariffs at the beginning of

2014. These were smaller demonstrations and with much police violence, but, without the breath of June.

Therefore, such demonstrations, with their diversity of demands and protests, drive for society (especially for the organized sectors) the challenge to rethink their ways of mobilization and political action. The voices of the streets, often contradictory, were able to express that the current political "model" has weakened (Moreira and Santiago, 2013). It is necessary, therefore, to understand and pay close attention to these movements, when they question the lack of representativeness of National Congress, and the point of view of civil society organization, when they problematize forms of representation and mobilization, with a strong brand of representative democracy. Divergences and insults to traditional social movements presented in the demonstrations reveal this questioning and discontent.

Finally, it is possible to see that in the June Days many of the elements raised by this article, as builders of a new form of youth engagement, were confirmed in the Brazilian example, as: a) Fundamental role of the existing communication tools (especially social networks); b) Despite a unifying agenda at the beginning, the plurality of thought and political agenda; c) Resistance to traditional organizations by the masses a reluctance of traditional organizations to be part of the movement; d) Lack of unfolding and permanence of struggle in the medium term.

IV. Initial Findings

The purpose of this article is to initiate a debate on the new generation of mass demonstrations led and composed by young people. It was possible to see how rare of a historical moments this is, where in many countries, in different contexts, young people have taken to the streets demanding an alternative future.

At the present moment we can say that there are some unifying factors of these different movements in the world, such as mobilization via the Internet and social networks, the plurality of political agendas in the same demonstration (even if there is a general banner that links the political agenda) and the distance of the traditional organizations. The organization of these mass protests is usually made by autonomist movements that believe in direct action as their primary tool, and collective and democratic decision making as their primary process.

However, it is also clear that this set of movements face limitations. The lack of a clear organization, or any organizational structure (in most cases), raises questions concerning the ability of these movements to exist in any sphere beyond the immediate present moment and outside of the streets. What happens between marches? Between each round of the fight? In Brazil, for example, only six months after the demonstrations in June, the governments of two Brazilian states increased their bus fares. There were demonstrations, but much smaller and without the national (and international) attention, they quickly dissolved.

In this sense, despite the limitations, it is possible to see that there are organizational innovations in these current forms of youth engagement that can be used in traditional organizations. Its high level of democracy and internal participation encourages young people to commit themselves to the struggles and feel part of the movement. In some cases, the protests lasted days, police responded violently, and it did not disperse much of the components. One could also argue that the decline of youth engagement in traditional organizations is also a consequence of the lack of updates and the constant attempt to use old methods in a new and rich environment.

The rejection of traditional organizations and political parties, at times manifesting itself in actual forceful attacks on political members (as seen in the Brazilian case study), raises hugely important questions of theory and praxis. Without a political analysis, vision, or organization, what does it mean to be outraged? Can such frustration be channeled into anything beyond street protests?

Finally, we also suggest that this research continues with new case studies. To better understand the current trend of organizational youth, it is essential to compare and look closely at more examples. For this purpose, the GLU network is an excellent tool. We are hopeful that this initial research will spark interest in expanding the project among alumni. Understanding the events unfolding today will help reshape the future world for youth, workers, and all citizens.

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